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Abstract. The paper discusses the theory of semiosis in the context of Peirce’s phi-
losophy of evolution. Focussing on the thesis that symbols grow by incorporating 
indices and icons, it proposes answers to the following questions: What does Peirce 
mean by the “self-development of signs” in nature and culture and by symbols as liv-
ing things? How do signs grow? Do all signs grow, or do only symbols grow? Does 
the growth of signs presuppose semiotic agency, and if so, who are the agents in 
semiosis when signs and sign systems grow? The paper discusses objections raised 
by culturalists and historical linguists against the assumption that signs can still 
grow and are still growing in complex cultures, and it draws parallels and points out 
differences between Peirce’s theory of semiotic growth and the theories of memetics 
and teleosemiotics.
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Growth, evolution, and the co-evolution of mind and 
the universe
Biological organisms and species grow and evolve, but dead matter does not, as it 
seems; it can merely change. Nevertheless, growth is also attributed to lifeless things, 
such as fl oods, capital, costs, or economic output. We speak of urban “growth”, 
growth in sales, economic growth rates, etc. – Peirce claims that “symbols grow” (CP 
2.302, c. 1895). It is certainly not unusual to hear that ideas, ideologies, dictionaries, 
or technical terminologies grow, but do they grow like organisms? In which sense 
can signs and sign systems be said to grow? Or is the use of the word “growth” with 
reference to ideas a “mere metaphor”? 
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Th e premise of the title of this paper – that signs grow – is rooted in the evolu-
tionary philosophy and semiotics of Charles S. Peirce. Evolution and evolutionism 
were the great themes of Peirce’s time: “Today, the idea uppermost in most minds is 
Evolution,” declared Peirce in 1901 (EP 2: 72), but his own contribution to the ongo-
ing debate was not restricted to Charles Darwin’s and Herbert Spencer’s topics of 
biological and social evolution. It extended much further and included cosmogony 
(cf. Turley 1977) as well as the evolution of the laws of nature and of mind.
For Peirce, growth is a “law of mind” (CP 6.21, 1891), a law of the “general 
development of reason” (CP 1.615, 1903) as well as a law of the evolution of nature 
and the entire cosmos (CP 6.101g, 1901). Not only do phenomena, such as mind, 
thought, reason, and symbols grow. Even crystals are among the objects to which 
Peirce attributes growth, although he does not fail to specify that these grow in a dif-
ferent sense than living organisms do, namely by “merely attracting matter like their 
own” (CP 6.250, 1891). Th e diff erence between the growth of crystals and living 
organisms is that crystals grow according to a deterministic law, the “law of causa-
tion” (CP 8.330, 1904) in the sense of effi  cient causes, not of fi nal causality (Santaella 
1999). Evolutionary growth, by contrast, follows a diff erent law. Th e law of evolution 
follows “the tendency to take habits” (CP 6.32, 1891). Whereas growth according to 
deterministic principles is a phenomenon of Secondness, the evolutionary tendency 
to take habits is a phenomenon of Th irdness: “Chance is First, Law is Second, the 
tendency to take habits is Th ird. Mind is First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Th ird,” 
says Peirce in his “Architecture of Th eories” (CP 6.32, 1891).1 
1 However, this is not to say that physical nature belongs to the realm of Secondness in 
general, and only biological nature belongs to the realm of Th irdness. Th e evolution of nature 
is not only the evolution of biological nature. Physical nature has also its evolutionary history, 
and cosmic evolution is a matter of Th irdness, too. A more diff erentiated distinction between 
the kinds of action and reaction in the realm of physical laws and processes obeying the Law 
of Mind is the following: “Generally speaking genuine secondness consists in one thing acting 
upon another, – brute action. I say brute, because so far as the idea of any law or reason comes 
in, Th irdness comes in. When a stone falls to the ground, the law of gravitation does not act 
to make it fall. Th e law of gravitation is the judge upon the bench who may pronounce the law 
till doomsday, but unless the strong arm of the law, the brutal sheriff , gives eff ect to the law, 
it amounts to nothing. True, the judge can create a sheriff  if need be; but he must have one. 
Th e stone’s actually falling is purely the aff air of the stone and the earth at the time. Th is is a 
case of reaction. So is existence, which is the mode of being of that which reacts with other 
things. But there is also action without reaction. Such is the action of the previous upon the 
subsequent. It is a diffi  cult question whether the idea of this one-sided determination is a pure 
idea of secondness or whether it involves thirdness. At present, the former view seems to me 
correct. […] Th e relation between the previous and the subsequent consists in the previous 
being determinate and fi xed for the subsequent, and the subsequent being indeterminate for 
the previous. But indeterminacy belongs only to ideas; the existent is determinate in every 
respect; and this is just what the law of causation consists in” (CP 8.330, 1904).
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Growth is absent from the realm of genuine Firstness, the domain of phenom-
ena such as chaos, chance, and spontaneity, but it is also absent from the domain 
of genuine Th irdness, the realm of phenomena such as absolute regularity, deter-
ministic law, and petrifi ed habit because when regularity and law prevail absolutely, 
change, as well as growth are no longer possible. Growth must therefore be sought in 
phases of transition and transformation, in the evolution from original Firstness to 
Th irdness as well as in those moments in which laws and habits become destabilized 
by disturbances, which give rise to new regularities and habits. Th is is Peirce’s meta-
physical account of cosmic growth (cf. Turley 1977). Cosmic evolution is growth 
from chaos to states of order repeatedly disturbed by spontaneous and unexpected 
new changes:
Th e evolution of the world […] proceeds from one state of things in the infi nite 
past, to a diff erent state of things in the infi nite future. Th e state of things in the 
infi nite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the total 
absence of regularity. Th e state of things in the infi nite future is death, the noth-
ingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spon-
taneity. Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is some 
absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, 
which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit. (CP 8.317, 1891)
Th e laws of nature did not exist as early as the beginning of the universe. Th ey are 
the result of a growth of regularities out of an original chaos. Th is law of growth is 
guided by concrete reasonableness: “From the merest chaos with nothing rational in 
it, the universe grows by an inevitable tendency more and more rational” (MS 807: 
16, n.d.). Since growth is a characteristic of the expanding universe, this growth is 
itself growing so that it is self-refl exive. Habit taking is a habit itself, which accounts 
for the acceleration of habit taking in the course of evolution: “Th e tendency to form 
habits, or tendency to generalize, is something which grows by its own action, by the 
habit of taking habits itself growing” (CP 8.317, 1891). 
Th e law of mind, which is “the primary and fundamental law of mental action”, 
becomes apparent “in a tendency to generalization” (CP 6.21, 1891). Th is tendency 
is not “a fi gment of mind”, as the medieval nominalists believed. It results from the 
more general laws of continuity (synechism) and from the premise that there is “rea-
sonableness” in nature, an axiom of natural philosophy which Peirce attributes to 
Aristotle: “Every evolutionism must in its evolution eventually restore that rejected 
idea of law as a reasonableness energizing in the world […] which belonged to the 
essentially evolutionary metaphysics of Aristotle” (EP 2: 72, 1901). 
Th at the ever-growing “tendency to obey laws” (CP 1.409, 1890), which is char-
acteristic of evolution, cannot be determined by blind laws, which admit no varia-
tion, is particularly evident in the evolution of mind. “Exact conformity [to the 
 The growth of signs 175
regularities of laws] would be in downright confl ict with the law [of mind]; since it 
would instantly crystallize thought and prevent all further formation of habit”, writes 
Peirce (CP 6.23, 1891). As long as the growth of mind goes on and we continue to 
have the freedom for “spontaneity counter to all law” (CP 8.317, 1891), evolution 
allows creativity and diversity.
Th e growth of symbols is particularly evident in the development of scientifi c 
knowledge, which is a special instance of the growth of symbols. Here, we encounter 
a self-refl exive loop similar to the one of growth, as discussed above. When human 
minds study the evolution of nature, they also study their own evolution. Nature has 
thus become self-refl exive: symbols, which have evolved from nature, begin to refl ect 
on the nature from which they have evolved: “Th e laws of nature have, I suppose, 
been brought about in some way; and if so, it would seem that they were of such 
nature as inevitably to realize themselves” argues Peirce (EP 2: 72fn, 1901). 
Nature, with its capacity to refl ect on itself, has become self-similar in the sense 
that the scientifi c models or diagrams by means of which nature, at its present point 
of evolution, describes itself have structures inherent in nature before it became 
self-refl exive. Th e laws that human minds discover are the same laws as the ones 
from which human minds have evolved. In the discovery of nature through human 
minds, nature discovers itself. Peirce expresses these ideas in the following poetic 
image: “It is somehow more than a mere fi gure of speech to say that nature fecun-
dates the mind of man with ideas which, when those ideas grow up, will resemble 
their father, Nature” (CP 5.591, 1903). In this sense, nature is not the object of study 
of science; it is one of the main agents in the process of research.
The self-development of signs
Th e growth of thought, ideas, or signs in general manifests itself in several forms and 
kinds. Peirce writes that “it is of the nature of thought to grow” (CP 2.32, c. 1902), 
and more emphatically, that “thought must live and grow in translation” (CP 5.594). 
Since “thought is always taking place by means of signs” (CP 1.444, 1896), growth of 
thought is at the same time growth of signs: 
Th ought […] is in itself essentially of the nature of a sign. But a sign is not a sign 
unless it translates itself into another sign in which it is more fully developed. […] 
Th ought must live and grow in incessant new and higher translations, or it proves 
itself not to be genuine thought. (CP 5.594, 1903)
If signs grow incessantly and the growth of signs occurs in the process of the trans-
lation of a sign into another sign, which is the interpretant of a preceding sign, the 
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process of semiotic growth is autopoietic in the literal sense of the word, that is, it is 
‘self-creative’. Signs grow self-creatively, but not in the sense of Maturana and Varela’s 
radical theory of autopoiesis, which postulates that an organism grows “within a 
closed domain of relations specifi ed only with respect to the autopoietic organiza-
tion that these relations constitute” (Maturana, Varela 1980: 135). For Peirce, signs 
grow autopoietically in a diff erent sense and not because of the allogpoietic agency 
of the sign users but because of the sign’s inherent power to generate interpretant 
signs: 
Semiosis  – the generation of the interpretant  – as always due primarily to the 
agency of the sign itself rather than to the agency of an interpreter, human or 
otherwise, does not deny that human agency has an important role in the occur-
rence of meaning phenomena, in changes in meaning, in the creation of meaning, 
and so forth. It does mean, though, that an interpreter’s interpretation is to be 
regarded as being primarily a perception or observation of the meaning exhib-
ited by the sign itself […] and that such control as we do have over the powers of 
signs (thus over meaning phenomena in general) lies in our skill at setting them 
in interaction with one another in the compositional process in ways favorable to 
some desired result. (Ransdell 1992: 43)
Th e growth of symbols and thoughts does not only mean that signs grow autono-
mously in the above-specifi ed sense and that they acquire new meanings. It also 
means that there is a development from signs of a more primitive kind to “more fully 
developed” signs, as Peirce put it in the above quote of 1903. In the process of their 
growth, symbols do not only grow in meaning, but they also, self-referentially, give 
evidence of their own growth. Th e degree to which they do so testifi es to the degree 
of their evolution: “Th e highest kind of symbol is one which signifi es a growth, or 
self-development, of thought […], and accordingly, the central problem of logic is 
to say whether one given thought is truly […] a development of a given other or 
not” (CP 4.9, 1905). Th e key term here, which captures Peirce’s theory of autopoie-
sis concisely, is ‘self-development’. Symbols and the reasons contained in the logic of 
their arguments grow alone because, in the long run, arguments which lack reason-
ableness have an inherent tendency to being superseded by more reasonable ones. 
Although they need their defenders in order to be divulged, strong arguments and 
good reasons spread with an agency that is in a way independent from the agency of 
those who disseminate them:
Whatever one’s theory may be as to the invalidity of human reason, there are cer-
tain cases where the force of conviction practically cannot be resisted; and one of 
these is the experience that one opinion is so far from being as strong as another in 
the long run, though it receives equally warm support, that on the contrary, ideas 
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utterly despised and frowned upon have an inherent power of working their way 
to the governance of the world, at last. True, they cannot do this without machin-
ery, without supporters, without facts; but the ideas somehow manage to grow 
their machinery, and their supporters, and their facts, and to render the machin-
ery, the supporters, and the facts strong. […] Most of us, such is the depravity of 
the human heart, look askance at the notion that ideas have any power; although 
that some power they have we cannot but admit. Th e present work, on the other 
hand, will maintain the extreme position that every general idea has more or less 
power of working itself out into fact; some more so, some less so. (CP 2.149, 1902)
How symbols grow by incorporating icons and indices
Th e evolution from Firstness to Secondness and Th irdness, which began with the 
origins of the universe, has a parallel in the way signs develop from icons, which are 
signs of Firstness, via indices (signs of Secondness), to symbols (signs of Th irdness). 
Icons are needed to show what we are talking about and indices to connect our 
thoughts to the reality which they represent. Symbols are associated to the objects 
they represent by habits (cf. Nöth 2010), but habits cannot change as such, nor can 
they arise out of nothing. Th ey can only become stronger or weaker. A new habit, 
by contrast, must begin with new experiences, which involves indexical and iconic 
signs. Th is is why symbols cannot grow by themselves. “A symbol, in itself,” says 
Peirce, “is a mere dream; it does not show what it is talking about” (CP 4.52, 1893).
Likewise, indices cannot grow alone. A sign that has grown conveys more infor-
mation than it did before. An index alone cannot grow because it has a strictly local 
signifi cation and is devoid of the generality necessary for a sign to be informative: 
“Th e index asserts nothing; it only says ‘Th ere!’ It takes hold of our eyes, as it was, 
and forcibly directs them to a particular object, and there it stops” (CP 3.361, 1885).
A pure icon cannot grow either. It signifi es because of qualities inherent in itself 
(see Nöth 2003b). Qualities, however, are what they are, but they cannot grow. 
Furthermore, pure icons are always vague and without real referents since they only 
represent qualities. Th is is why “the idea embodied by an icon […] cannot of itself 
convey any information, being applicable to everything or to nothing” (CP 3.433, 
1896), although icons, especially in the form of diagrams and mental images, are 
able to modify symbols and can thus contribute to their growth (see Nöth 2012b, 
2014b). 
Concerning the contribution of icons to the growth of symbols, Peirce writes: 
“Symbols grow. Th ey come into being by development out of other signs, parti-
cularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of icons and sym-
bols” (CP 2.302, 1893). Th e necessary participation of indices in the growth of 
symbols is addressed when Peirce specifi es that symbols grow the more towards 
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perfection, the more they incorporate icons and indices and that “the most perfect of 
signs are those in which the iconic, indicative, and symbolic characters are blended 
as equally as possible” (CP 4.448, 1903). Th e notion of the “most perfect of signs” 
implies that there are degrees to which symbols have incorporated iconic and index-
ical elements in the course of their growth.
How symbols grow by incorporating icons and indices is the topic of Peirce’s 
theory of information (Nöth 2012a). Typically, they grow in the form of symbolic 
dicents. Dicents are signs which have the form of a proposition and which can be 
true or false. An example of an informative and true verbal dicent is: Whales are 
mammals. 
According to Peirce’s reinterpretation of the medieval distinction between signi-
fi cation and denotation, a proposition incorporates an index in its subject term and 
an icon in its predicate term. Th e index is the part of a dicent that denotes. It does so 
by selecting a specifi c object, here whales, about which the predicate might give fur-
ther information. Th e predicate is the iconic part of the symbolic dicent. It signifi es 
by evoking images of qualities or characteristics of the object. In sum: “A proposition 
consists of two parts, the predicate which excites something like an image or dream 
in the mind of the interpreter, and the subject, or subjects, each of which serves to 
identify something which the predicate represents” (MS 280: 32, c.1905). 
Against this background, informational growth can take place both in the subject 
or index part of the proposition and, independently of it, in its predicate or icon part 
(CP 2.419, 1893). Th e sentence Whales and cows are mammals exemplifi es an indexi-
cal growth in relation to the above proposition since the class of denotata selected 
by the proposition has increased in comparison to the proposition Whales are mam-
mals. Th e sentence Whales are aquatic mammals exemplifi es an iconic increase since 
the qualities attributed to the subject have become more. 
Symbols do not only grow in the form of dicents and arguments but also as 
concepts or terms, which are rhematic signs. Concepts grow with the increase of 
knowledge or amount of information that they have accumulated in the course of 
time. Icons and indices participate insofar in the growth of rhematic symbols as the 
denotation of a concept implies an index and its signifi cation implies an icon. Peirce 
illustrate the concept growth as follows: “Such words as force, law, wealth, marriage, 
bear for us very diff erent meanings from those they bore to our barbarous ances-
tors” (CP 3.608, 1903). Th e growth of meaning exemplifi ed by these words is not 
refl ected in an increase of verbal or lexical meaning but in encyclopaedic knowledge. 
Th is knowledge grows in parallel with the growth of science: “Th e woof and warp of 
all thought and all research is symbols, and the life of thought and science is the life 
inherent in symbols” (CP 2.220, 1903). 
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Th e history of the word electricity may serve as an example (CP 5.313, 1893; MS 
905, 1907; cf. Short 1988: 86). Th e Oxford English Dictionary, in its edition of 2001, 
summarizes it as follows: 
Electricity, n. […]: In early use: the property of amber, glass, and certain other 
substances of attracting lightweight objects when rubbed […]; (also) the state 
produced in such substances by rubbing. Subsequently: the cause of this phe-
nomenon (and of others found to be of the same origin, such as electric sparks 
and lightning), a form of energy occurring in two modes (positive and negative) 
as an intrinsic property of electrons and certain other subatomic particles, and 
produced as a fl owing current when a conductor such as a copper wire is moved 
through a magnetic fi eld.
Benjamin Franklin considered electric phenomena to be due to a fl uid […]. 
Later in the 19th cent. the prevailing view was that electricity is a distinctive condi-
tion either of the molecules of an electrifi ed object or of the ether surrounding it. 
Th e example shows how one and the same word has grown both through the addi-
tion and subtraction of characteristics attributed to it and how the word, since its 
fi rst coinage in the early 17th century, has made progress in its fi tness to represent 
the object of the sign, that is, electricity. In the growth of the term, Peirce sees ele-
ments of life and concludes: “Every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense 
that is no mere fi gure of speech. Th e body of the symbol changes slowly, but its 
meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off  old ones” (CP 
2.222, 1903).
Knowledge grows through interpretation, or as Peirce puts it: in their interpre-
tants, signs grow in information (CP 3.608, 1908). Knowledge is produced in a pro-
cess in which a sign is interpreted in the form of a new and more informative sign, 
the latter being the interpretant of the former. Not all interpretants of symbols are 
informative. Feelings and spontaneous reactions, for example, are uninformative. 
Informative interpretants are the signs through which symbols grow. In metaphors 
borrowed from characteristics of living organisms, Peirce describes how terms grow 
in their interpretations as follows: 
Th e process of getting an equivalent for a term is an identifi cation of two terms 
previously diverse. It is, in fact, the process of nutrition of terms by which they 
get all their life and vigor and by which they put forth an energy almost crea-
tive – since it has the eff ect of reducing the chaos of ignorance to the cosmos of 
science. Each of these equivalents is the explication of what there is wrapt up in 
the primary – they are the surrogates, the interpreters of the original term. Th ey 
are new bodies, animated by that same soul. I call them the interpretants of the 
term. And the quality of these interpretants, I term the information or implication 
of the term. (W 1: 464–65, 1866)
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In language, symbol growth has two forms. Either an existing word acquires new 
meanings, as the word electricity did in the course of its history, or a neologism is 
coined, which increases the existing vocabulary. Peirce describes the creation of 
neologisms as an autopoietic process in the above-defi ned sense, when he states that 
new symbols can only be created by means of symbols, for example, in the form of a 
defi nition of a new word: “If a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving 
concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de 
symbolo” (CP 2.302, 1893). 
Peirce illustrates how symbols are able to create new symbols by the hypothet-
ical example of a new trade name introduced for a gas stove entering the market: 
“Perhaps the most marvelous faculty of humanity is one which it possesses in com-
mon with all animals and in one sense with all plants, I mean that of procreation. 
[…] If I write ‘Let Kax denote a gas furnace’, this sentence is a symbol which is creat-
ing another within itself ” (W 1: 497 = CP 7.590, 1866). 
Th e self-creativity of symbols is rather multifaceted. Th at symbols stem from sym-
bols does certainly not mean that they only descend from symbols. Above, we con-
cluded already that new symbols have also icons and indices at their root. Another 
semiotic premise of the omne symbolum de symbolo dictum is that signs in general 
are the premise as well as the consequence of signs. Th ey do not originate from non-
signs, from some presemiotic state of unmediated (or immediate) perception. Peirce 
had defended this theory since his 1868 paper on “Questions concerning certain fac-
ulties claimed for man”, in which he had developed the doctrine that whenever there 
is a sign, there must have been a sign that preceded it (cf. Linde, Nöth 2014). 
Culturalist objections against the idea that symbols grow
Objections against the theory that signs have characteristics of living organisms are 
not hard to fi nd (e.g., Kull 2002), but signs in Peirce’s defi nition are not only words; 
they are ideas in a much broader sense, which includes texts, books, ideologies, 
para digms, whole languages, and cultures. 
Th ere are two historical objections against the assumption that symbols in 
this broader sense should evince growth. Th e fi rst is that symbols are in constant 
decline. We fi nd it in antiquity as the myth of the evolution of a Golden via a Silver 
and a Bronze Age towards an Iron Age of humanity. In the early 20th century, it was 
Oswald Spengler who propagated an infl uential decline theory in his treatise on the 
Decline of the West. In a semiotic guise, the idea of decline reappeared decades later, 
when Baudrillard declared that we have reached a crisis of representation in which 
the signs have lost their referents and only empty catch phrases have survived (cf. 
Nöth 2003a). 
 The growth of signs 181
However, the cultural pessimists who reject the idea of growth are not concerned 
with the growth of knowledge, science, and theoretical concepts. Th ey deplore the 
decline of social and cultural life styles, fashions, of the “grand narratives” (Lyotard), 
of life on the screen, wars that have become mere fi ction or monetary systems in 
whose values they see only loss and no gain. When Baudrillard and others deplore 
the loss of the referents in the signs in the media of contemporary culture, they are 
not talking about the progress or lack of progress refl ected in the symbols of scien-
tifi c research. Th ey want to comment on how representations of cultural and social 
life have changed. Notice that Baudrillard does not extend his thesis of the loss of the 
referents to his own discourse. When he thus protects his own socio-semiotic analy-
ses from the scope of what he criticizes, he makes a distinction between intellectual 
or theoretic discourse, arguing that the latter deserves exemption from his thesis of 
the loss of the referent and the discourse found in popular culture, which is the goal 
of his critique.
A fundamental diff erence between the views of those who do not believe that 
symbols grow and Peirce’s views to the contrary is in the assumption concerning 
the degree zero from which the growth or decline of symbols should be measured. 
Th ose who postulate the decline of the referent in fi lms in the age of digital imaging 
(see Lefebvre, Furstenau 2002) or even the decline of cultures in our contemporary 
society presuppose, whether explicitly or implicitly, that the symbols we are using 
today formerly represented values which they no longer represent. However, the 
arguments remain vague or even nostalgic as long as the critics do not specify the 
values that are supposed to have gone lost. 
In his theory of semiosis, Peirce is neither concerned with social or moral val-
ues nor with the alleged decline of cultural values. Instead, his topic is the growth 
of knowledge. Knowledge does not only grow because of the incessant endeavour 
of researchers to discover new facts and laws of mind and nature. Th e symbols that 
represent the laws of nature also have an inbuilt mechanism that makes them grow 
because of a property of their own. As paradoxical as it may sound, this property is 
their incompleteness. Th e very incompleteness of the symbols representing their fi eld 
of research urges researchers to advance their studies. Due to their generality and 
fuzziness, symbols are by necessity imperfect. By the researcher’s eff orts to overcome 
this incompleteness, symbols continue to grow. Imperfection is the opposite of gener-
ality, so that the law of increasing generality predicts the eradication of imperfections: 
So, then, the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been com-
pletely perfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth. […] Th e 
development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in 
manifestation. Th e creation of the universe […] is this very development of 
Reason. (CP 1.615, 1903)
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Th e second argument against the idea of the growth of symbols is that languages and 
cultures have essentially no longer grown since the earliest languages about which 
we have knowledge. In modern linguistics, the consensus is that no known language 
is more developed than any other is. Th ere are only diff erences, but no language is 
more advanced than another. Languages can neither progress nor decay. All lan-
guages are equally complex and equally evolved, albeit in diff erent ways (Aitchison 
2013). Th e counterpart in cultural theory is that all cultures are equally complex and 
equally fi t to survive. Th is is essentially the position of the culturalists and cultural 
relativists. 
However, the evidence given by those who claim that there is no more progress 
in language is almost exclusively a phonological, morphological, or syntactic one. 
However, such evidence cannot invalidate Peirce’s theory of the growth of symbols, 
which is concerned with the growth of knowledge in general and of scientifi c con-
cepts in particular. Peirce is not concerned with the grammar of symbols but with 
knowledge representation. Although his theory does not predict why certain phono-
logical or grammatical structures become extinct, whereas others survive, nor why 
some grammatical structures are “optimal” whereas others are not, it can explain why 
and in which direction vocabularies and terminologies grow. Th at there is growth in 
language in this sense has been postulated a century and a half ago by Charles Lyell 
with arguments that can still today hardly be refuted. Darwin’s contemporary wrote: 
“Progressive improvement in language is a necessary consequence of the progress of 
the human mind from one generation to another. As civilisation advances, a greater 
number of terms are required to express [...] ideas and things, which a single word 
had before signifi ed, though somewhat loosely and imperfectly” (Lyell 1863: 467).
Historical and evolutionary linguists on 
the growth of symbols
Th e growth of symbols should be high on the research agenda of biosemiotics, bio-
linguistics, cultural anthropology, the theory of cultural evolution, evolutionary 
cultural semiotics, evolutionary linguistics, and the theory of evolution in general. 
Is it really? Th e diff usion of human symbolism out of Africa across the rest of the 
globe is undeniably a scenario of the growth of symbols, but mere diff usion is only 
quantitative growth. Th eories of the growth of meaning and knowledge are scarce 
although such growth is undeniable. It must suffi  ce to illustrate this state of art in 
two domains of research, historical and evolutionary linguistics.
Historical linguistics has studied laws of language change, not of growth, as 
described above. None of the classical laws of sound, morphological, syntactic, or 
semantic change formulated since the early 19th century is a law of growth. Semantic 
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change, for example, has been described in terms of broadening, narrowing, shift , or 
metaphorical and metonymic change. Broadening and metaphorical extensions are 
candidates for a theory of growth, but such growth is usually accompanied by pro-
cesses of narrowing. For example, the English word dog has broadened its meaning 
some seven hundred years ago from the meaning of a particular kind of dog to ‘dog 
in general’, but there was no growth since the new meaning of dog is essentially the 
same as the meaning which was previously expressed by the older word hund. Th e 
older word simultaneously narrowed its meaning to its present meaning. 
Th e lack of attention given to the topic of growth may be less obvious in evolu-
tionary linguistics since in the study of the origins and the evolution of language, 
the growth of symbols is too obvious. However, if we look at biolinguistics, the 
Chomsky-inspired variant of evolutionary linguistics, we can see that not symbols 
and their growth are being studied but the anatomical and genetic evolution of sym-
bol users, that is, the evolution of the species of Homo sapiens sapiens. 
In contemporary biolinguistics, there is the tendency to naturalize symbols in the 
search for their origins. Th e hot topic is the question of how language is localized in 
the anatomy of the cerebrum and in human genes. Th e hope is to unveil the mystery 
of the origins of language with methods of the natural sciences. Instead of asking 
how signs grow, biolinguists ask how the human language capacity can be accounted 
for by anatomical or genetic evidence. Semiotic growth becomes a matter of biologi-
cal growth. Th at this approach may lead in the wrong direction, as far as the origins 
of semiosis is concerned, was suggested by Peirce more than a century ago. In his 
famous inkstand parable, Peirce suggested that the brain lobe which enables a writer 
to write is as much the writer’s tool as the technical medium of writing, the paper, 
the pen and the ink; today we can add the personal computer, which are as necessary 
to write down his or her ideas as the brain is (cf. Nöth 2002). 
Undoubtedly, linguists and anthropologists have made much progress in solving 
the riddle of the origins of language. Th e state of the art of the research results can 
hardly be reviewed here; a brief look at the question of the growth of symbols must 
suffi  ce. Have symbols grown from indices and icons as Peirce’s evolutionary semiot-
ics suggests? What is the evolutionary evidence? What are the relevant hypotheses? 
Th at indexical signs must be the immediate evolutionary precursors of symbols, 
and icons the precursors of indices, has been argued most convincingly by Deacon 
(1997: 70–75, 87) with evidence from the primate research programme of the 1980s. 
Apparently, the verbal symbols of humans are fi rst and essentially only learned as 
indices by chimpanzees, and the sequence icon–index–symbol is also characteristic 
of language acquisition in humans. Complementary research comes from Merlin 
Donald (1991: 226), whose book on the Origins of the Modern Mind postulates an 
early iconic phase in the evolution of human symbols in which “mimetic representa-
tion” based on “mental modelling” took place.
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Nevertheless, the role of the icon in the evolutionary growth of symbols seems 
to be less well understood than the one of the index, at least from the perspective of 
Peirce’s broader theory of iconicity. Deacon speaks of “iconic reference” and inter-
prets icons as signs recognized as such because of their similarity with their objects. 
Donald speaks of “the principle of similarity that links mimetic actions and their ref-
erents” (1998: 61). However, the term “iconic reference” is a contradiction in terms 
if icons are defi ned as Peirce defi nes them. For Peirce, icons have no referents at all. 
As images, they represent qualities, and as diagrams, they represent general patterns. 
Such characteristics of icons in particular can shed light on the transition from sym-
bols that are mere words and symbols that have evolved syntactic structures.
The agency and life of symbols
Another aspect of the Peircean theory of semiotic evolution that needs to be con-
sidered briefl y is the one of the autonomous agency of the symbol in relation to its 
users (cf. Nöth 2002, 2009). A brief look at some of the above quotes reveals what it 
is about. Instead of symbol makers who create new signs, Peirce speaks of the “self-
development” of symbols. Not only does he attribute “life and vigor” to symbols and 
“strength” to arguments, but – horribile dictu – he even speaks of symbols which have 
grown to “new bodies animated by the same soul” (see above; W 1: 464–65, 1866). 
Peirce knew well that scholars committed to the humanist tradition could only 
look askance at such ideas. Signs are instruments of human minds, and human sign 
makers use them with intentions of their own. Th is is their credo (see Nöth 2009). 
For Peirce, by contrast, human sign makers are not fully autonomous agents, who 
use signs as mere instruments to extend their minds, for the semiotic agency of 
sign users is also controlled by the meanings inherent in the symbols they use, the 
power of ideas, and the logic of valid arguments. Th e sign is not “given” a meaning 
by its users; it does not “receive” its meaning from its interpreter. Before it becomes 
actually interpreted, the symbol has already a meaning in the sense of an interpre-
tative potential. Peirce defi nes this meaning as the immediate interpretant of the 
sign, and says that it “is implied in the fact that each Sign must have its peculiar 
Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter” (SS 110–11, 1909). Th e same holds 
true for ideas in general, which are, or course signs, too. Good and true ideas do not 
only have a potential but also an inherent power to succeed. “Ideas are not all mere 
creations of this or that mind, but on the contrary have a power of fi nding or creat-
ing their vehicles, and having found them, of conferring upon them the ability to 
transform the face of the earth” (CP 1.217, 1902).
Peirce’s above quoted insight that “it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can 
grow” (CP 2.302, 1893) is also true of ideas, by which Peirce means symbols insofar 
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as they enable us to have thoughts, irrespective of whether we actually think them (cf. 
CP 6.455, 1908). Like symbols, ideas grow through an agency of their own, and in 
this process, the “souls” of those who use these ideas, have no full power over them 
either. Nor do ideas grow as a mere refl ex of the facts that they represent. Th at ideas 
need the agency of sign users to spread is undeniable. However, it is only the very 
ideas that enable sign users to have thoughts and to communicate at thoughts at all: 
Many logicians [say] that ideas arise from the consideration of facts in which there 
are no such ideas, nor any ideas. Th at opinion is a superfi cial one […]. So, those 
logicians imagine that an idea has to be connected with a brain, or has to inhere 
in a “soul”. Th is is preposterous: the idea does not belong to the soul; it is the soul 
that belongs to the idea. Th e soul does for the idea just what the cellulose does for 
the beauty of the rose; that is to say, it aff ords it opportunity. It is the court-sheriff , 
the arm of the law. (CP 1.216, 1902).
Memes and the teleosemiotic theory of semiotic growth
Dawkins’s (1976) theory of memes and some of the subsequent theories based on 
Dawkins’s premises seem to off er independent support to Peirce’s theory of the life 
of signs in semiosis. Like Peirce, Dawkins attributes life to signs. In Dawkins’s defi -
nition, memes are semantic or informational elements endowed with the capac-
ity of copying or ‘replicating’ themselves. In this way, they become disseminated 
in the minds of the members of a culture. Some of the authors who have extended 
Dawkins’s premises refer to memes as viruses, which spread by contagion (see also 
Nöth 2012c). A Darwinist component of the theory of memetics is the assumption 
that genes disseminate according to the laws of natural selection. 
It is neither necessary nor possible to elaborate on the details of memetics, which 
are well-known. From the perspective of biosemiotics, Deacon (1999) and Kull (2000) 
have addressed some of its weak points. Th e authors point out that the processes of 
copying, self-reproduction, and replication of genes diff er from the ones of the dis-
semination of signs. What is of interest here is not another critique of memetics, but 
the question whether the replication of memes, as conceived by Dawkins and other 
theoreticians of memetics, can exemplify the growth of symbols as defi ned by Peirce. 
Th e answer is essentially no. From Peircean premises, the mere replication of memes 
would have its semiotic analogue in the replication of a symbol through its types, that 
is, the instances of its use in specifi c situations. Th e replication of a symbol type in 
the form of its tokens is certainly a prerequisite, but not a suffi  cient condition for the 
growth of a symbol. A necessary condition of symbol growth is an interpretant, in 
which the meaning of the symbol can grow, but a symbol token is not the interpretant 
of the symbol. A symbol is a type, of which its tokens are its mere instantiations.
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Th e same objection applies to a line of research in cognitive semiotics discussed 
elsewhere under the name of teleosemiotics (cf. Nöth 2009). It includes Millikan’s 
teleo semantics, Dretske’s teleofunctionalism, and Papineau’s teleological theory of 
representation (Dretske 1983, 1988; Papineau 1987). Millikan’s teleosemantics, for 
example, in contrast to what her key term suggests, is not only concerned with lan-
guage since she, a former student of Charles Morris, extends her philosophical inter-
pretation of the role of language in culture to the one of material objects, such as 
tools and technological devices.
In contrast to the mainstream doctrines of intentionality in verbal behaviour, 
as defended by Chomsky, Fodor, Searle, or Grice, which defi ne speakers’ inten-
tions as the sole cause of language utterances, Millikan, like Peirce, ascribes autono-
mous purposes to the signs by which speakers communicate. Th e purpose of a sign, 
according to Millikan, is its “proper purpose” or “proper function”. Millikan’s teleo-
semiotics is rooted in the Darwinist theory of biological evolution (Millikan 2004: 
14–27), and the author does not fail to acknowledge her indebtedness to Dawkins’s 
theory of memes (Dawkins 1976) with its postulate that cultural products, such as 
words, catch phrases, slogans, or melodies, spread in human minds like genes spread 
in living species. 
Millikan argues that ultimately all signs, even intentional verbal signs, have 
evolved from natural signs such as the ones of nonverbal animal behaviour. Th e dif-
ference which she sees between the signs of animals and those of human language is 
that the former are genetically replicated, whereas the latter are replicated by learn-
ing, that is, in the form of sign tokens (re)produced from “some earlier token or 
tokens of its type that the speaker has heard” (Millikan 1984: 22). In the long pro-
cess of their divulgation through replication, cultural signs “never lose their charac-
ter of being also natural signs” (Millikan 2004: 105). Like the nonverbal signs of ani-
mals, words and sentence patterns survive as sign types by being reproduced in the 
form of their tokens (Millikan 2005: 3). All cultural signs have their own “reasons for 
survival” (Millikan 1984: 28). A major purpose of natural and cultural signs is to be 
replicated in their usage. Millikan describes the reasons for the survival of signs as 
follows:
Artifacts that have been serving certain functions known to those who reproduce 
them and that are reproduced on this account (e.g., household screwdrivers) have 
these functions as direct proper functions. Behaviors that result from training or 
from trial and error learning involving correlations of a reward with the behav-
ior have as direct proper functions to produce that reward. Behaviors that result 
from imitation of behaviors of others because the latter behaviors have correlated, 
within the observation of the learner, with certain functions have these functions 
as direct proper functions. (Millikan 1984: 28)
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Th e fi nal causes of the replication of words and of the patterns of verbal syntax are 
the eff ects which utterances have in successfully coordinated acts of verbal commu-
nication (Millikan 2005: 45): “Conventional language devices are selected for per-
forming services satisfactorily at once to both partners in communication” (Millikan 
2004: 26) since “a primary function of the human language faculty is to support 
communication” (Millikan 2005: 39). Th e form of a speech act that succeeds in 
implanting the speaker’s belief in the hearer’s mind is “selected for reproduction” and 
is replicated (ibid.: 39). Th e grammatical form of the indicative mood, for example, 
survives because of the success which sentences in the indicative mood have in con-
trast to sentences in the subjunctive or imperative mood. Sentences in the indica-
tive mood are verbal forms serving successfully as “guides in forming beliefs”; with-
out the success in the use of this grammatical form, “speakers would stop trying to 
use them to impart beliefs. Production of true beliefs, then, is a linguistic function, 
a purpose, of the indicative form itself, whether or not a particular speaker and/or 
hearer have as their own purpose to use it in that way on a given occasion” (Millikan 
2005: 190–91). 
Th e “proper purpose” which a sign has independently of its user is hence to sur-
vive and to proliferate by staying in circulation (Millikan 2005: 53). Not restricted 
to a theory of verbal signs, Millikan’s teleosemiotics is a general theory of signs 
(Millikan 1984: 85), which explains the replication of genetically transmitted sign 
behaviour of animals as well as the proliferation of artefacts in culture. Th e pur-
pose of a “technological meme”, such as an arrow whose design is copied again and 
again because it shoots well, is self-replication “by serving people’s prior interests” 
(Millikan 2004: 18). Millikan gives the following evolutionary account of the main 
diff erence between signs and instruments: artefacts, such as tools and other instru-
ments, have individual inventors, and their inventions, if successful, tend to be rep-
licated. Verbal signs, by contrast, evolve like species or body organs, which have 
no individual inventor but stem from an ancestor whose genes have proliferated 
(Millikan 1984: 3). Furthermore, there is a diff erence in how they replicate. Whereas 
words are replicated from one or many tokens in the process of language learning, 
instruments are signs that are always replicated from a type: “Items produced by 
mass production are usually reproductions of some prototype not produced on the 
line – some original experimental model” (Millikan 1984: 21). Words are not repli-
cated by means of genes, but from precedents and conventions “thought to have little 
tendency to emerge or re-emerge in the absence of precedent” (Millikan 2005: 7). 
Language conventions are “lineages of behavioural patterns” repeating precedents of 
successful communicative interactions (Millikan 2005: 86). 
A thorough analysis of the affi  nities and diff erences between Peirce’s general 
semiotics and Millikan’s teleosemiotics is a desideratum of current semiotic research, 
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but in our context, which is restricted to the growth of signs, the following conclu-
sion can suffi  ce:
(1)  Millikan’s concept of sign is much narrower that Peirce’s theory of the sign. Her 
restriction to signs of human beings and signs in animal behaviour reduces 
her semiotics to the fi eld of anthroposemiotics and zoosemiotics, ignoring the 
broader implications of biosemiotics, the semiotics of nature and certainly the 
semiotics of machines.
(2)  Millikan’s account of signs surviving as types reproduced in the form of tokens 
shows the restriction of her semiotics to symbolic legisigns and their replicas; her 
semiotics ignores the role of qualisigns, sinsigns, iconic, and indexical signs in the 
growth of signs.
(3) Millikan’s theory of semiotic teleology and her views concerning the purpose of 
signs are much narrower than Peirce’s teleological theory of semiosis (see, e.g., 
Short 1983).
(4) Whereas Millikan’s teleosemiotics is restricted to the Darwinist biological para-
digm of evolution, in which self-replication and survival of the fi ttest is the evolu-
tionary purpose of genes, species and, by extension, signs, Peirce’s general semiot-
ics is also a logic of signs. Signs are not only self-replications in the infi nite process 
of semiosis, they also develop in a process of semiotic growth: “Th e purpose of 
signs” says Peirce (CP 2.444, fn, c.1893), “– which is the purpose of thought – is 
to bring truth to expression”.
Conclusion and further perspectives
Th e growth of signs, as Peirce sees it, is the growth of knowledge. Only symbols can 
grow and represent more knowledge than they did before, but symbols cannot con-
vey any knowledge without indices, which connect them with facts and experience, 
and without icons, which create mental images of the objects they represent. Th e 
growth of symbols through the incorporation of icons and indices is autopoietic in 
the sense of ‘self-creative’. Although symbols need sign makers and users as agents 
to convey their message, these agents are not fully autonomous in the making of 
new symbols and in attributing new meanings to them. Symbols are not organisms 
of fl esh and blood, but they do replicate themselves like organisms do, and, in their 
process of their replication in new contexts, symbols grow in meaning.
Th e growth of symbols is a topic of such multi-faceted and far-reaching impli-
cations in the framework of Peirce’s theory of semiosis that only some of its impli-
cations, presuppositions, and consequences could be addressed within the limited 
scope of this paper. For those interested in the study of further aspects of this topic, 
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some brief references to further implications of this topic might be useful before 
concluding this paper. 
Th e fi rst is vagueness and incompleteness as prerequisites for the growth of 
symbols. Symbols can only grow because they represent their objects incompletely. 
In the course of their growth, they tend to represent their objects more and more 
completely, but no symbol (the term includes books and whole libraries) will ever 
represent its object without some remaining incompleteness. A world of symbols 
that would represent its objects completely would be a world in which semiosis had 
ended. Nothing would remain to be inquired (cf. Nöth, Santaella 2011). 
A second aspect to be pursued in further studies is the growth of symbols from 
mere words to habits (of thought and action) and habit change (Nöth 2010). In 
MS 283 (103–104, 1905), as summarized by Kent (1987: 197), Peirce made it clear 
that “an endless series of signs, which never get realized in action but are translated 
into nothing but signs, would not show any growth”. Th is aspect of their growth is 
implied in Peirce’s pragmatic maxim and it is a consequence of Peirce’s postulate that 
semiosis that ends in mere words is incomplete. Words merely express verbal mean-
ings, which are “very inferior to the living defi nition which grows up in the habit” 
(CP 5.491, 1907).
Further aspects of the topic are the role of creativity and abductive reasoning 
(Anderson 1987), the growth signs in learning (Nöth 2014c, d), and the biosemiotic 
implications of the growth of signs (Nöth 2014a). Do symbols really “grow” as bio-
logical beings do, or is it a “mere metaphor” to speak of the growth of symbols?
Let us conclude with still another, certainly not the last, aspect of this topic, 
the one of the critical voices against Peirce’s theory of the autonomy of signs. As 
briefl y mentioned above, Peirce, with his idea that symbols grow autonomously, 
risked a scandalon among anthropocentric and humanistic minds, many of whom 
have decided to ignore Peirce’s ideas in this regard. One who has made his opposi-
tion explicit is John Boler (1964). Th e author objects to Peirce’s thesis of the relative 
autonomy of the symbol in relation to its producers and interpreters. As Boler sees 
it, “Peirce does not avail himself of the standard kind of argument: that […] a deed 
that must have a doer”. Th e alleged “error” in the theory of the autonomous growth 
of symbols is that Peirce “dispensed with the individual mind that functions as an 
interpreter” (Boler 1964: 388) and that “in denying the interpreter any signifi cant 
role, Peirce has placed an intolerable burden upon the series of interpretants” (Boler 
1964: 392). Half a century aft er this critique, in the light of new insights into evolu-
tion as co-evolution, into the situatedness of human cognition, and into the place 
of humans in an umwelt that restricts their semiotic autonomy, a thorough revision 
of Boler’s anthropocentric critique of Peirce’s insights into the growth of symbols is 
high on the agenda of contemporary research.
190 Winfried Nöth
References
Aitchison, Jean 2013. Language Change: Progress or Decay. [4th ed.] Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Anderson, Douglas R. 1987. Creativity and the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce. Dordrecht: Nijhoff .
Boler, John F. 1964. Habits of thought. In: Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce 
II. [Moore, Edward C.; Robin, Richard S. (eds.).] Amherst: Massachusetts University Press, 
382–401.
CP = Peirce, Charles S. 1931–1958. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. [Hartshorne, Charles; Weiss, Paul (eds.), 1931–1935; vols. 7–8. 
Burks, A. W. (ed.) 1958; In-text references are to CP, followed by volume and paragraph 
numbers.]
Dawkins, Richard 1976. Th e Selfi sh Gene. [Rev. ed. 1989] Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deacon, Terrence W. 1997. Th e Symbolic Species: Th e Co-Evolution of the Brain and Language. 
New York: Norton. 
–  1999. Memes as signs. Th e Semiotic Review of Books 10(3): 1–3.
Donald, Merlin 1991. Th e Origin of the Modern Mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
–  1998. Mimesis and the executive suite. In: Hurford, James R.; Studdert-Kennedy, Michael; 
Knight, Chris (eds.), Approaches to the Evolution of Language. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 44–67.
Dretske, Fred 1983. Th e Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: MIT Press.
–  1988. Explaining Behavior. Cambridge: MIT Press.
EP 2 = Peirce, Charles S. 1998. Th e Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings. Volume 2 
(1893–1913). [Th e Peirce Edition Project (ed.)]. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Kent, Beverly 1987. Logic and the Classifi cation of the Sciences. Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press.
Kull, Kalevi 2000. Copy vs. translate, meme vs. sign: Development of biological textuality. S. 
European Journal for Semiotic Studies 12(1): 101–120.
–  2002. A sign is not alive – a text is. Sign Systems Studies 30(1): 327–335.
Lefebvre, Martin; Furstenau, Marc. 2002. Digital editing and montage: Th e vanishing celluloid 
and beyond. Cinémas: Revue d’études cinématographiques 13(1–2): 69–107.
Linde, Gesche; Nöth, Winfried. 2014. A note on Peirce’s quotations of Persius’s half-line hoc 
loquor inde est. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50.2.
Lyell, Charles 1863. Th e Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man, with Remarks on Th eories 
of the Species by Variation. [2nd rev. ed.] London: Murray.
Maturana, Humberto R.; Varela, Francisco J. 1980. Autopoiesis and Cognition. Dordrecht: 
Reidel.
Millikan, Ruth 1984. Language, Th ought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for 
Realism. Cambridge: MIT Press.
–  2004. Varieties of Meaning. Cambridge: MIT Press.
–  2005. Language: A Biological Model. Oxford: Clarendon.
MS = Peirce, Charles S. ([1963–1966]1979). Th e Charles S. Peirce Papers. [30 reels, 3rd micro-
fi lm edition.] Cambridge: Th e Houghton Library, Harvard University, Microreproduction 
Service. [In-text references are to MS, followed by manuscript number according to Robin.] 
Nöth, Winfried 2002. Semiotic machines. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 9(1): 5–22.
–  2003a. Crisis of representation? Semiotica 143(1–4), 9–16. 
–  2003b. Semiotic foundations of the study of pictures. Sign Systems Studies 31(2), 377–392.
 The growth of signs 191
–  2009. On the instrumentality and semiotic agency of signs, tools, and intelligent machines. 
Cybernetics & Human Knowing 16(3–4): 11–36.
–  2010. Th e criterion of habit in Peirce’s defi nitions of the symbol. Transactions of the Charles 
S. Peirce Society 46(1): 82–93.
–  2012a. Charles S. Peirce’s theory of information: A theory of the growth of symbols and of 
knowledge. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 19(1–2): 99–123.
–  2012b. Medieval maps: Hybrid ideographic and geographic sign systems. In: Baumgärtner, 
Ingrid; Stercken, Martina (eds.), Herrschaft  verorten: Politische Kartographie des Mittelalters 
und der Frühen Neuzeit. Zürich: Chronos, 335–353.
–  2012c. Signs from the life of organisms, species, languages, and the media. In: Maran, 
Timo; Lindström, Kati; Magnus, Riin; Tønnessen, Morten (eds.), Semiotics in the Wild: 
Essays in Honour of Kalevi Kull on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday. Tartu: University of 
Tartu Press, 123–130.
–  2014a. Th e life of symbols and other legisigns: More than a mere metaphor? In: Romanini, 
Vinicius; Eliseo, Fernandez (eds.), Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of Life. 
Heidelberg: Springer, 171–182.
–  2014b. Th ree paradigms of iconicity research in language and literature. In: Shinohara, 
Kazuko; Akita, Kimi; Hiraga, Masako (eds.), East Meets West: Iconicity in Language and 
Literature. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
–  2014c. Th e semiotics of learning new words. Journal of the Philosophy of Education 48(3): 
446–65.
–  2014d. Signs as educators: Peircean insights. In: Semetsky, Inna; Stables, Andrew (eds.), 
Pedagogy and Edusemiotics. Rotterdam: Sense, 446–65.
Nöth, Winfried; Santaella, Lucia 2011. Meanings and the vagueness of their embodiments. 
In: Th ellefsen, Torkild; Sørensen, Bent; Cobley, Paul (eds.), From First to Th ird via 
Cybersemiotics – A Festschrift  Honoring Professor Søren Brier on the Occasion of his 60th 
Birthday. Copenhagen: SL forlagene, 247–282.
Papineau, David 1987. Reality and Representation. Oxford: Blackwell.
Peirce, Charles S., see CP, EP, MS, SS, W.
Ransdell, Joseph. 1992. Teleology and the autonomy of the semiosis process. In: Balat, Michel; 
Deledalle-Rhodes, Janice; Deledalle, Gerard (eds.). Signs of Humanity  – L’homme et ses 
signes. Vol. 1. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 43–48. 
Robin, Richard S. 1967. Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce. Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press.
Santaella, Lucia 1999. A new causality for the understanding of the living. Semiotica 127: 
497–519.
Short, Th omas L. 1983. Teleology in nature. American Philosophical Quarterly 20: 311–320. 
–  1988. Th e growth of symbols. Cruzeiro semiótico (Porto) 8: 81–87.
SS = Peirce, Charles S. 1977. Semiotics and Signifi cs: Th e Correspondence between Charles 
S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby. [Hardwick, Charles S., ed.] Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.
Turley, Peter T. 1977. Peirce’s Cosmology. New York: Philosophical Library.
W = Peirce, Charles S. 1982–. Th e Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A Chronological Edition. [Fisch, 
Max H. et al., eds.] Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [In-text references are to W, 
followed by volume number.]
192 Winfried Nöth
Рост знаков
В статье рассматривается теория семиозиса в контексте пирсовской философии 
эволюции. Исходя из тезиса, что символы растут путем инкорпорирования индексов и 
икон, автор предлагает ответы на следующие вопросы: Что имеет в виду Пирс, говоря о 
«саморазвитии знаков» в природе и культуре, считая при этом символы живыми? Как 
знаки растут? Растут ли все знаки или только символы? Предполагает ли рост знаков 
семиотическую агентность, и если так, то кто является действующим лицом в семиозисе 
при росте знаков и знаковых систем? В статье рассматриваются доводы культурологов 
и историков языка в противовес предположению, что знаки могут еще расти и растут 
в комплексных культурах; сравнивается пирсовская теория семиотического роста с 
меметическими и телеосемиотическими теориями.
Märkide kasvamine
Käesolevas artiklis vaadeldakse semioositeooriat Peirce’i evolutsioonifi losoofi a kontekstis. 
Keskendudes teesile, et sümbolid kasvavad indekseid ja ikoone inkorporeerides, pakutakse 
vastuseid järgmistele küsimustele: Mida mõtleb Peirce “märkide isearengu” all looduses ja kul-
tuuris ning sümbolite kui elusolendite all? Kuidas märgid kasvavad? Kas kasvavad kõik märgid 
või ainult sümbolid? Kas märkide kasvamine eeldab semiootilist agentsust ja kui see on nii, 
siis kes on semioosis toimijad, kui märgid ja märgisüsteemid kasvavad? Artiklis käsitletakse 
kultuuriuurijate ja keeleajaloolaste vastuväiteid oletusele, et märgid võivad ikka veel kasvada 
ning kasvavad komplekssetes kultuurides, tõmmatakse paralleele Peirce’i semiootilise kasvu 
teooria ning memeetika ja teleosemiootika teooriate vahel ning osutatakse nende erinevustele.
